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From Clinic to Congregation: 
Religious Communities and 
Genetic Medicine1 
By M. Therese Lysaught 
Although many factors drive genetic research, a fundamental impetus is one 329 
that undergirds medicine itself-the moral duty, obligation, conviction that we 
a~~ to relieve human suffering, to cure human illness, when we have the capa-
bility and the moral freedom to do so. Fueled by this conviction and the massive 
federal funding of the Human Genome Project, the database of information 
about genetics and technologies tailored to this data grow at a phenomenal rate. 
Almost daily, newspapers announce the discovery or near-discovery of another 
new gene. 
Essential to this impetus is a second conviction, one less familiar to conven-
tional medicine-a belief that locates disease in an individual's genetic structure. 
Thus, as presidential task forces and policy analysts currently attempt to reform 
the external structure of health care delivery, a quieter, subtler reformation--or 
better, transformation-is already occurring within medicine: a metamorphosis 
to genetic medicine. A genetic approach to medicine not only redefines what 
constitutes "disease" and "health." When translated into the clinical setting, it 
shifts the traditional province of medicine from a crisis-management acute care 
model, which attends to problems as they become manifest, to a model of "predict 
and manage," which anticipates and seeks to forestall disease and illness through 
lifestyle and environmental management or genetic intervention.2 
As this metamorphosis continues, individuals will more frequently find 
themselves immersed in a health care system that increasingly speaks the lan-
guage of genetics. Many of these individuals will likely be some of the 145 million 
individuals who worship in one of the 358,000 religious congregations in the 
U.S.3 As such, they will go from the offices of physicians and genetic counselors 
The human genome project is an attempt to identify all the genes on the human chro-
mosomes that determine the biological makeup of every indtvidual. Armed with such 
knowledge, argues M. Therese Lysaught, doctors will face intense pressure to practice 
medicine in a way that differs radically from practice at present. Rather than responding 
to disease, they will attempt to eliminate the biological conditions that create disease in 
the first place. The church as a community of distinctive moral discourse needs to become 
familiar with the genome project and its consequences for medicine, so as to be able to 
make informed and appropriate decisions. Ms. Lysaught is a research associate at the Park 
Ridge Center in Chicago. 
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to the offices of clergy and pastors, seeking guidance on how to interpret the 
information they have received, how to locate the information in a context of 
belief that will give it meaning, how to envision and weigh the implications 
of various courses of action. They will want to know: "If I am at a high risk, 
should I have my fetus genetically screened?" "I have been told I possess the 
gene for X-what does that mean?" "Should I avoid having children?" "Will 
gene therapy change my daughter's identity?" 
To begin the process of giving meaning to information about genetics, 
congregants and pastors might tum to theologians or chaplains who participate 
in the dialogue between religion and genetics.4 However, in what little has been 
written to date, recent advice of those who represent religion in these discussions 
indicates a disheartening trend, evident in theoretical positions: 
Advances in genetics occasioned by the Human Genome Project call for Protestant and 
Roman Catholic theologians to re-examine the adequacy of traditional interpretations of creation, 
human nature, moral choices, and the relation of humanity to nature.5 
Posing these questions and suggesting that answers might be found in the notion of 
ongoing creativity could become significant as religious leaders wake up to what is going on in 
research .. .. The fear of the unknown future seems to be fueled by a desire to locate some-
thing unchanging within the material world, something that connects us with the eternal 
and unchanging God .... Should this religious disposition prevail, the present generation 
will be accused of "playing God," and theological arguments will be mustered to call for a 
halt to further genome research. If this happens our churches might find themselves in the 
embarrassing position of advocating ignorance over knowledge, of supporting the status 
quo in preference to transformation.6 
!This paper originated out of two lectures, one to a meeting of the Christian Action 
Commission of the Reformed Church in America held at Hope College in Holland, Mich., 
and the other to members of Holy Trinity Lutheran Church, Glenview, Ill. I am grateful to 
my colleagues Dan Dugan and Ron Hamel for their helpful editorial comments. 
2See Jeff C. Goldsmith, "The Reshaping of Healthcare," Hcaltlzcare Forum Journal 35.3 and 
4 (May /June and July I August 1992): 19-27 and 34-41. 
3Kenneth B. Bedell and Alice M. Jones, Yearbook of Americatl and Canadian Churches , 1992 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1992). For more statistical information on religion in the U.S. see, 
From Belief to Commitment: The Community Service Activities and Finances of Religious Congre· 
gations in the U.S. (Washington: The Independent Sector, 1993). 
4Religious voices have been active in ethical discussions since the beginning of the genetic 
era. For brief overview of this history see J. Robert Nelson, "The Role of Religions in the 
Analysis of the Ethical Issues of Human Gene Therapy," Human Gene Therapy 1 (1990): 
43-48. 
5Theodore Frank Peters, "Theological Questions Raised by the Human Genome Initiative," 
(Unpublished Grant Proposal! ROl HG00487-01, Submitted to the NIH/ELSI Program, 
1990): 21. Emphasis mine. 
6Ted F. Peters and Robert J. Russell, "The Human Genome Project: What Questions Does 
It Raise for Theology and Ethics?" Midwest Medical Etltics (Summer 1992): 12-17. Emphasis 
mine. It is interesting, or more precisely, puzzling, to me that these fearful, backward 
religionists who prefer ignorance to knowledge, are accused of "supporting the status quo." 
One could marshall significant evidence to illustrate that the current status quo is defined 
by the technological imperative: if it can be done, it must be done. The current status quo 
is one that allows no limits to technological innovation-or "transformation" in Peters' 
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The same trend is also evident in practical positions: 
Religious groups should admca/t' adequate access to reliable genetic inform.1tion .1nd coun· 
seling services, and appropriate training for genetic counselors? 
Oergy are in a unique position to link the issues of [genetics) lo religious or spiritu.1l 
teachings and practices. This is part of their job. But clergy, no less than phy~ici.1ns .1nd 
other hospital personnel, must be careful not to dictate ... choices. BiaSt'S rt•g.mling wl1.11 
constitutes quality of life, especially, have no place .... Clergy should act as t-duc.llors, nul 
enforcers of rules. Autonomy and free will are closely related.8 
Implicit-{)r not so implicit-in these statements is a shared conviction: religion 
is to be the handmaid of science. Religious groups and religious proft-ssionals are 
called to use their social influence to advance the cause of genetics. It is timc, wc 
are told, for religion to catch up, to "wake up," to scientific advanCL'S, progn-ss, 
truth and discoveries about the human condition. Religion-authoritari.ln, unre.1· 
soning, absolutist, and fear-driven-is portrayed as intellectually, epistemologi· 
cally and ethically inferior to science, that value-neutral promoter of cre.1tivity, 
rational inquiry, and human progress. The "truths" discovered by scicnce dL'-
mand revision in religious beliefs. 
Pastors who heed this one-sided counsel fail in their calling and fail thcir 
parishioners. Clearly, pastors and theologians should not simply reject genetics 
out of fear and ignorance; equally they ought not act as cheerlcaders to advance 
the cause of genetics qua science and progress. Rather, clergy and thcologians 
are called to engage their communities in processes of moral reflection and 
action, forging with congregants well-reasoned, theologically and scientifically 
informed frameworks for evaluating questions, challenges, and resources raised 
by genetics. These frameworks will, in different instances, lead congregants to 
abjure some .particular genetic endeavors, to tread tentatively in the face of 
others, and to welcome still others. Moreover, when these framcworks offcr 
viable alternatives to practices logically indicated by genetic technology, they 
words. It takes little moral courage to give science a blanket endorsement lo keep on doing 
what it has been doing and what it wants to do. Aristotle defined courage as being afr.1id 
of the right thing in the right situation; it takes one with moral courage, who h.1s sufficient 
creativity to envision possible negative outcomes, to challenge the sial us quo and muster 
gOO<j theological arguments which might weigh against a particular genetic ende,wor. 
1. Robert Nelson, "Summary Reflection Statement, June 1, 1992-Genetics, Religion, and 
Ethics Project: The Institute of Religion and Baylor College of Medicine, The Tex.1s Mcdic.1l 
Center," International Journal of BiO£'/hics 4.1 (March 1993): 20. 
8Laurel Arthur Burton, Suzanne B. Yellen, and Ellen Elpem, "Making Use of the 1'.1tit•nt 
Self-Determination Act," TI1c Chris/ian Ctnlury 109:20 (June 17-24, 1992): 617. This p.1s!'.1ge 
comes out of a reflection on advance directives, but the general position is reflected in 
literature on genetics and, given the authors' premises, can be extrapolated to genetics. 
While my position also promotes clergy as "educators," the literature tends to suggest th.1t 
clergy be "non-directive." However, as leaders, clergy are called to be directive-not bi.1sro, 
but directive. It is part of their job to marshal the best arguments and social/commun.ll 
resources in support of theologically sound positions. It is also part of their job to pr.1cticc 
true forgiveness, which is not equivalent with tolerance. 
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332 h out of and are translated into moral action, will do so because t ey emerge . . . 
mel liturgical and social practices which embody the frammg conv1~1~ns 
na y, . h ld of living with genetic differences and uncertamtJes. 
and create m t e wor ways . . . 
By modelling such alternatives, religious commumtJes may well help ~oc1ety ~o 
" k p" to the ideological and culturally-laden implications of certam genetic 
wa e u r " 
technologies; like religion, science too can be "fundamenta 1st. . . . 
But first, clergy need to attend to the problems faced by th~1r pa~shwne:s 
as they move from clinic to congregation. In order to think and hve fmthfull~ m 
the face of genetic information, parishioners need: (1) a renewed u~derstandmg 
and experience of the religious community as a place of moral ~tsc_our~e and 
moral formation; (2) basic and up-to-date information about genetics, 1ts history, 
its social context and function, its limits and its possibilities; and (3) ongoing 
dialogue on how new choices created and imposed by genetics and medicine 
bear on issues of major concern to the Christian faith. In the following, I will 
comment, albeit too briefly, on each of these. 
I. Christian Communities as Places of Moral Discourse 
Substantive moral discourse--which is by definition "public"-has become 
increasingly elusive in our culture.9 The problem, it is claimed, is that the 
warrants used by most people for moral evaluation and decision-making-Qur 
particular identities and commitments, especially cultural beliefs and religious 
convictions-are personal, private, and incommensurate. So personal are they, 
in fact, that to evoke or invoke them often seems a novelty or a breach of 
the etiquette of public exchange. Worse, however, it is claimed that they are 
destructive of public tranquility and cohesion by forestalling the possibility of 
communication, understanding, and consensus. Public life and its moral dis-
course is therefore rendered either as unfettered pluralism celebrated for its own 
sake or a thin, grey universalism which renders all difference invisible. 
Over against these extremes stands the alternative of Christian communi-
ties-waning, it is true, but still viable. Members of Christian communities-
although far from uniform-claim and are claimed by commonalities: a common 
activity of worship, a common language of faith, a common story of the Gospel, 
a common text of Scripture, common practices such as baptism, forgiveness, 
and prayer, common beliefs about the character of God and the world, the 
common task of discipleship. These commonalities resist the fragmentation and 
9Most are familiar with Alasdair Macintyre's description of the incoherent state of con-
temporary moral discourse and his diagnosis of the problem in the severing of moral 
frameworks from their communal, anthropological, and traditional correlates (After Virtue 
{Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1981)). H. Tristram Engelhardt has proposed 
a moral framework coherent with specific anthropological and sociological structures of 
our culture, but rather than rectifying the chaos, it renders normative the impossibility of 
reasoned public moral discourse informed by particular commitments (The Foundations of 
Bioethics (New York: Oxford, 1986)). 
From Clinic to Congregation: Religious Communities and Genetic Medicine 
idiosyncracy of contemporary culture. They create a "public" forum by providing 
shared components for building a shared identity, a common moral framework. 
Such a framework supplies the context within which differences in individual 
experiences, identities, and understandings can be meaningfully discussed. 
Moreover, these commonalities provide not only community but content, 
particular visions of human flourishing that shape contexts for interpretation. 
Members of Christian communities claim that embedded in their traditions and 
embodied in their practices are truths that provide premises for reasonable argu-
ments: that God exists; that God's character is of a certain sort; that God intends 
certain ends for human beings and relates to human beings in certain ways. 
These are convictions which guide people's actions-even if tacitly-convictions 
by which people orient their lives, "in their worship, and in their living and their 
dying and their suffering and their caring for the suffering."10 
While the nature of contemporary public philosophy renders it difficult 
to identify operative or tacit religious convictions in public moral reflection or 
integrate them where possibly indicated, Christian communities can provide 
models of what this integration might look like, as Allen Verhey has noted: 
In communities of faith, by some grace there is an effort to attend to God and to resp_ond 
appropriately to God, to attend to all things as related to God and to respond to all thmgs 
in ways appropriate to their relations to God. There the tradition exists not merely as an 
archaic relic in an age of science and reason but as that which continues to evoke and 
to shape the loyalties and the identities of the community and its members, even as t~ey 
make use of science and reason .... There people ask how religious convictions can gmde 
and limit new medical powers. I 1 
Although this is an ideal which few congregations meet, it is a challenge to 
which congregations are called. 
But congregations provide not only the communal conditions of possibility 
and content for moral discourse and action; they also supply models of it. Many 
try to reduce religion to "themes" or "beliefs" or "principles" which can be 
applied to a situation apart from the agents involved or a communal worshipping 
context. But religious beliefs are neither self-evident nor self-interpreting. An 
ability to see and understand religious dimensions of life and events is forged 
over lifetimes and through communal and embodied practices. In this process, 
we learn from others. From the stories of Scripture and experiences of others, 
we learn how to see what God's grace looks like in events. From others in the 
tradition and in the community, we learn how-and how not-to understand 
the stories of Scripture and to correlate them with seemingly novel situations. 
From the successful and less-successful attempts of others to live faithfully, we 
learn what discipleship "looks like," not in 50 c.e. Palestine but in navigating 
contemporary culture. From others we learn how to forgive ourselves and others 
10Allen D. Verhey, "Talking of God-But with Whom?" The Hastings Center Report 20.4 (A 
Special Supplement, July I August, 1990): 22. 
11Verhey, "Talking of God," p. 22. 
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334 for inevitable moral failure. Others demonstra~e how the ritu.als and practices of 
Christian life can sustain us in and through times of confusiOn. . 
N f th. · y of course nor will it always be successful; Chns-one o IS IS eas , , . . 
tian communities are often known more for their error a~d pohllcs than for 
being well-informed and well-intentioned. Like the ~oral l~fe generally, moral 
discourse within Christian communities will not be tidy, Will not supply easy, 
clear-cut answers. Moral discourse within Christian communities will most often 
focus not only on the "what to do" but also on questions of "why o~ght I do 
X?" or "how do I go on in the face of Y?" These questions now anse _out of 
individuals' experiences of genetic medicine. In order adequately to dehbcrate 
on the "what," "why," and "how" of genetics, clergy and congregants need _to 
understand the basics of genetics, the technologies it generates, and the SOCial 
practices that are evolving from genetic capabilities. 
II. Genetics and "Genetic Medicine" 
In order to give a sense of the complexity of genetics, of the truly technically 
fascinating capabilities of genetic ·science, of the types of jargon and concepts 
individuals will encounter, of the processes that might seem, on first glance, to 
be morally dubious but that may in fact be functioning as moral red herrings 
(such as the ominous sounding "murine retroviral vectors"), I would next like 
to outline some of the fundamental concepts of genetics, technologies they have 
generated, and some of the issues raised. While this portrayal will be admittedly 
incomplete, in it I will try to display what currently serve as the three major 
components of genetic medicine: genetic testing, genetic therapy, and genetically-
engineered pharmaceuticals.12 
Like any scientific field, genetics has developed its own arcane language. 
Long before one can begin to interpret a bit of genetic information, one must 
understand the words and the grammar.13 Although their meaning may be far 
12In this paper, I am attempting to focus on the clinical manifestations of genetics-that 
which congregants will encounter. Consequently, I will not directly engage the issue that 
has probably received more attention than any other-the issue of the creation of new life 
forms. Initial antagonists in the debate were most heated about the ability of recombinant 
DNA techniques and transgenic experiments to create new species or to alter the "species 
essence" of humanity. Some were concerned about the impact of these activities on the 
ecological balance; these and questions of biodiversity remain central. These issues resulted 
in much theological reflection on nature and creation. 
13The importance of understanding language for adequate interpretation is revealed by 
a recent Harris/March of Dimes survey. Respondents were asked if they approved or 
disapproved of gene therapy. 89% of those polled said they approved of gene therapy 
while 60% of the same pool confessed that they had heard almost nothing about the 
technique (New York Times, 9-29-92, B6). Not only must one understand this language, 
but one must be vigilant as well, insofar as the terms and phrases used often do a good 
bit of marketing. For example, the phrase therapeutic abortion adds a new procedure to the 
traditional armamentarium of therapy-i.e., ending a life. Likewise, both disease cure and 
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from clear, the fundamental terms of genetics are by now familiar: chromosomes, 335 
~NA, genes. Th~ nucleus of each cell in the human body (except the reproduc-
tive cells) contams 46 chromosomes-23 pairs. One chromosome in each pair 
comes from each of an individual's parents. From cell to cell within a particular 
person's body, these chromosomes are essentially the same; slight variations can 
be introduced if mutations occur during the replication of a cell. 
Chromosomes are composed of a substance called DNA-deoxyribonucleic 
acid-which is, in turn, composed of four molecules called nucleotides (adeno-
sine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine), represented with the letters A-T-C-G. Thus, 
chromosomes are essentially very, very long chains of molecules of A, T, C, 
and G. The order in which these molecules appears within a given segment 
of DNA-... ATGCGCfAATGCCGTAATCGTACGCGCGATGC ... -is often re-
ferred to as a "code," for through an intricate process of translation of this 
sequence, DNA directs the production of every protein, enzyme, and cell in 
the human body. A DNA segment that contains the sequence or code for an 
entire molecule or product is called a "gene." There are an estimated 50,000 to 
100,000 genes in et'ery lmman cell, containing up to 6 billion nucleotides. Thus, a 
single chromosome could conceivably contain an average of 2,000 genes, while 
a single gene could conceivably contain an average of 60,000 nucleotides that 
must be sequenced in a particular order for the gene to function correctly, that 
is, to produce the proper protein.t4 
·Aberrations in genetic structure are thought to cause approximately 3,000-
5,000 diseases or physical conditions, including: enzyme deficiencies, familial hy-
percholesterolemia, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, phenylketonuria, Gaucher disease, 
Hunter syndromes, sickle cell anemia, thalessemias, hormone production defects 
(such as absence of growth hormone), Tay-Sachs, Cystic Fibrosis, Huntington 
Disease. In conditions such as these, some alteration in the nucleotide sequence 
or in the location of the gene causes the body to produce either excessive amounts 
of some body proteins, dysfunctional versions of other proteins, or insufficient 
amounts of yet other proteins; the end result is disease. For example, diabetes 
is the result of the insufficient production and regulation of the protein insulin. 
Such conditions can be caused either by a single gene, a number of genes working 
in tandem, or through a combination of genetic, behavioral and environmen-
tal causes. 
enhancement are included under the rubric gene therapy. But enhancement is beyond the 
traditional jurisdiction of medicine and is difficult to warrant as "therapy." 
14The original objective of the Human Genome Project, the $3 billion, 15-year federally 
funded research project under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health, was to "map 
and sequence" the hum.an genome. To "map" the human genome means to determine the 
location of the 100,000 genes on the chromosomes. To "sequence" the human genome means 
to determine the nucleotide sequence (the ... ATGCGCTAATGCCGTAATAGCAT ... ) of 
each of those 100,000 genes. Since its initiation, the objective of the project has been scaled 
back to try to complete the "map" within the 15-year time frame. 
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These fundamentals of genetics suggested the first procedure in the reper-
toire of genetic medicine: genetic testing or screening.15 Genetic testing assays the 
chromosomes of adults and children, fetuses, and "pre-embryos" to determine 
possible gene variations which may correlate with diseases. The testing of chil-
dren and adults has three stated objectives: (1) to suggest lifestyle changes that 
might forestall the manifestation of disease or to suggest ongoing monitoring of 
symptoms; (2) to help individuals or couples make decisions about whether or 
not to have children; and (3) to help individuals plan their futures. The testing of 
fetuses and "pre-embryos" presupposes the possibility of "therapeutic" abortion, 
although in some instances it is undertaken in order that parents can ready 
themselves for their child's condition. 
Genetic testing is neither simple nor straight-forward. Clinicians can only 
test for known genes; a clear report does not completely assure freedom from 
possible genetic disease. Even with known genes, however, as with all med-
ical tests, false positives and false negatives can occur, both of which can be 
potentially devastating (especially to fetal patients). Since most conditions for 
which tests are available do not yet enjoy a cure or therapy, a pqsitive test can 
also be potentially devastating. Moreover, a positive test does not necessarily 
indicate disease, but rather indicates the probability of contracting a disease or 
condition. Genetic regulation is not completely understood, and it is possible that 
other genes or environmental factors may modify the way a particular gene is 
expressed; thus, a condition may not occur, or its severity may vary. 
Likewise, preconceptive testing also results only in probabilities. For ex-
ample, if an individual possesses a gene for a genetically recessive condition, 
she must marry with an individual who also possesses a gene for the same 
condition, and then there is only a 25% chance that their offspring will manifest 
the condition. In cases where one parent possesses two recessive genes and 
manifests the condition, the likelihood rises only to 50%. For conditions that 
are autosomal dominant-i.e., only one "defective" gene is required for the 
expression of the disease, an example of which would be Huntington's disease-
again there is only a 50% chance that a child will be afflicted. And again, in 
many cases the severity of the expression of the condition can vary, influenced 
by other genetic and environment factors. 
Although the rhetoric surrounding the pursuit of genetic knowledge cites 
as its warrant the decrease of suffering, the increase of health and choices, and 
the conquest of disease, at this point genetics can do little more than diagnose, 
predict, identify. As mentioned, for most of the conditions it diagnoses, no cures 
and few therapies are possible. However, for some conditions correlated with 
the absence or underexpression of a particular gene, initial experiments in "gene 
therapy" have recently proved successful. 
!.SGenerally, genetic testing refers to the testing of an individual, and genetic screening 
refers to the mass testing of populations or groups. 
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The first clinical trial in gene therapy was begun September 1990 at the 
National Institutes of Health, targeting a disease called severe combined im-
munodeficiency <SClD) or ADA deficiency.16 Other remedies to ADA deficiency 
are available, but since they are not always effective, researchers hypothesized 
that ADA deficiency might be treated by gene therapy by removing an affected 
patient's bone marrow cells, inserting normal genes for the enzyme into them, 
and returning the treated cells to the patient's body, where they could grow and 
perhaps produce enough of the needed enzyme to degrade the toxic chemicals, 
thus restoring immune function. 
In the first gene therapy experiment, the ADA gene was inserted into the 
DNA of the white blood cells by what is called a "murine retroviral vector," a 
genetically engineered mouse virus.t7 The procedure was successful: the trans-
fanned cells produced enough ADA to relieve the patient's severe immune 
deficiency even better than daily injections of the enzyme. The success of the 
ADA trials has led to the approval of seventeen further clinical trials of genetic 
therapy experimentation to test protocols for other conditions.18 
16See Charles Marwick, "As Number of Trials Increases, Gene Therapy Begins to Look 
Promising for Medicine's Future," Journal of the American Medical Association 267.21 (June 3, 
1992): 2854-2855. ADA deficiency, a relatively rare condition affecting about twenty people 
worldwide, usually causes death before the age of two years. Persons with this condition 
lack the enzyme adenosine deaminase (ADA), required to destroy toxic chemicals in white 
blood cells. Without it, white blood cells die and the immune system ceases to function. 
In ADA deficiency, the nucleotide sequence in the ADA gene is abnormal, usually caused 
by a mutation rather than inheritance. The mutation could be in the form of erroneous 
replacement of as little as one nucleotide by another or by the loss (or addition) of one or 
more nucleotides somewhere in the sequence. The altered sequence encodes an abnormal 
enzyme that does not function or causes insufficient production of ADA. 
17Retroviruses, like viruses, are essentially packets of DNA. They function by breaching a 
cell's external membrane, inserting their own DNA into the genomes of invaded cells, and 
reproducing themselves when the host cell reproduces. A mouse virus, however, does not 
exhibit pathological characteristics in human beings. 
1S0ver the next few years, one of the greatest areas of expansion in human gene therapy 
experimentation will probably be in the treatment of cancer. (See Natalie Angier, "Scientists 
Report Novel Therapy for Brain Tumors," New York Times, June 12, 1992, p. A12.) A novel 
and accidental protocol was reported in June 1992 for the treatment of brain tumors. Based 
on experiments with mice, researchers will inject genetically altered mouse skin cells into a 
patient's brain tumor. These cells have been designed to serve as _virus factories, releasing 
steady pulses of harmless viruses into the surrounding tumor mass, where they can infect 
the tumor cells in the manner just described. Each of the viruSes will carry a copy of a 
gene from a herpes virus which should make the infected tumor,cells susceptible to a 
potent anti-herpes drug called ganciclovir. The viruses will be given a week to infect the 
tumor cells, and then the patient will be given ganciclovir, which should kill the tumor 
cells. What makes this experiment particularly remarkable is its specificity. The delivery 
viruses can only invade cells that divide. Brain cells do not divide, while tumor cells often 
reproduce at an expedited rate. Thus, the ganciclovir will only affect tumor cells and the 
normal brain tissue will not be harmed. In the fourteen mice on which this experiment was 
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338 This and similar approaches to genetic therapy are called somali~ gene 
therapy, which works with the cells of an individual's body. An altemah~e.ap­
proach is called germline or gametic gene therapy. In these procedures, techmc1ans 
intervene in the genomes of either human gametes-sperm and ova-or of the 
cells of an early embryo. In somatic gene therapy, treatment affects only targeted 
cells in the patient's body, does not necessarily alter a person's genetic makeup, 
and functions like other therapies in that it needs to be periodically repeated; 
changes induced would not be passed on to children. Germline alteration, on the 
other hand, would produce genetic changes in all cells in the body (including an 
individual's reproductive cells), would introduce or remove characteristics on a 
permanent basis, and would not require repetitive interventions; these changes 
would be passed on to children. 
To date, germline genetic intervention in humans is not technically possible, 
and the use of somatic gene therapy is extremely limited. In its somatic form, 
gene therapy differs little from other types of therapeutic interventions. Concerns 
about somatic genetic therapy are primarily questions of medical feasibility and 
risk of side effects: "What are the alternative methods of treatment? Is gene 
therapy likely to be more effective, less costly, safer, or otherwise more acceptable 
than available alternatives?" "How safe. is the procedure? What are the data 
on short-term and long-term consequences?" "What are the side effects of the 
treatment and are they reversible or treatable?" These are, for the most part, 
practical questions. 
"Germline" genetic intervention, however, raises very different questions, 
not only, or even primarily, medical, but ethical, philosophical, social and the-
~l~gi~al. Advocates of human germline intervention generally invoke three jus-
hftcatiOns. They argue that not all genetic defects can be corrected through 
somatic ~nt~rventions. Secondly, they argue that germline genetic intervention 
could ehmmate the need for repeated prenatal diagnosis and selective abor-
tion in genetically at-risk families. Third, they argue that it could eliminate the 
ne~d for repeated somatic gene therapy from generation ·to generation. Thus, 
thetr argu~ents draw on the warrants of freedom, necessity, and utility.19 Fur·. 
ther, some advocates extend these arguments to recommend not only t11erapeutic 
carried out the brain tumors com I t I · h d · 
the other ;hree. p e e y vams e m eleven and regressed significantly in 
19Allen Verhey has noted that the public debate su . . . . 
genetics has generally b r .t d . rroundmg the eth1cal dimens10ns of 
benefits (utility) ("The Meenr~ml e to t~o ISsues: freedom and the weighing of risks and 
124-139) I think th ora I Yd~f Genetic Engineering," Christian Scholar's Review 14 (1985): 
· e current 1 10m for these tw · · h · 
engenders at least two roblems . . 0 lssu~s Is c o1ce and control. This focus 
notions of freedom andputility-~b~~\~~ %~sks the kmd of assumptions that li~ behi~d 
to each other. Second it shortcircu·t fl . ure, te£hnology, nature, of our relattonshtps 
. ' I s re ection on more funda t 1 . questions about "the sorts of p men a questtons, namely, 
. ersons we would be and be bo . f 
soctety we would be or become" (lb"d 12 come or a ut the kmd o I ., p. 6). 
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interventions but interventions to en1mnce an individual's (and their succes- 339 
sor's) capabilities. 
Those who oppose germline interventions likewise do so on a number of 
ground.s. Opponents challenge the rhetoric of control that surrounds germline in-
terventiOn. On the one hand, given our limited knowledge of genetic interactions, 
in developing these technologies, errors will ·occur, errors that are impossible 
to foresee and that may severely harm the future individuals involved. Again, 
given our limited knowledge of genetic interactions, it is not yet possible to 
foresee how changes in one part of an individual's genetic component may 
change the expression of another part. These changes may be perceived· as 
benign, but we have yet to explore the meaning of so intentionally shaping 
the genetic component of a person's identity and personality. True "control" is 
not a possibility. But should it be desired? What is the relationship between my 
control exercised in the creation of another individual and the other's autonomy 
or freedom? Should we be exercising this kind of control over our progeny? On 
what grounds? Have we yet exhibited that we are capable of the kind of wisdom 
and humanity that would authorize this kind of paternalistic exercise? Can mere 
desire, want, consumer taste provide sufficient guidance or authority? 
A third piece of genetic medicine is genetically engineered pharmaceuticals. 
Just as geneticists can insert a gene into a cell and have it produce a specific 
protein in a patient's body, in some instances they can do this in vitro, synthet-
ically producing large quantities of scarce biological compounds and receptor-
selective drugs. Current examples of such genetically engineered pharmaceuticals 
would be insulin and growth hormone, among the dozen or so currently avail-
able. While the health benefits of many of these pharmaceuticals are readily 
apparent, this pharmaceutical armamentarium raises questions similar to those 
raised by somatic gene therapy, primarily questions of cost, access, and allocation 
of resources. 
III. Contested Issues: Identity, Children, Power, Social Justice 
Given the nature of genetic medicine, medical intervention in the lives of 
individuals will likely begin earlier and be more constant: they will be routinely 
screened as fetuses; any potential genetic condition will be monitored over the 
course of a lifetime; if indicated, genetic therapy might be attempted; as new 
genes are discovered, individuals may need to be screened again, perhaps on a 
regular basis; their fetuses will be screened; increasing numbers of pharmaceuti-
cals will be produced through genetic techniques, and so on. 
At present, however, individuals are for the most part confronted with 
simple genetic information-"your fetus possesses an extra chromosome" or 
"you possess a gene implicated in breast cancer" or "you possess the gene 
for Huntington's chorea." In spite of claims to neutrality and canons of "non-
directiveness " such information tends to ca its w · · "You should 
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abort the fetus, spare it suffering, spare yourself the burden, and spare society 
the expense"; "We would advise prophylactic mastectomy"; or "You should get 
your affairs in order and inform your children; assisted suicide is available should 
you come near to losing your autonomy." While presented as "choices,· these 
implications, and others like them, gather momentum toward social normati1ity 
and become increasingly "self-evident" (the choice of the "reasonable" person) 
as they are increasingly practiced. 
These implications emerge out of a complex of anthropological, sociological 
and metaphysical commitments situated in a related structure of social practices. 
When, however, genetic information is considered in the context of community 
structured according to different practices and beliefs, the given implications 
are not quite as "self-evident." For those who consider genetic information in 
the context of a Christian community and its anthropological, theological, and 
sociological convictions and practices, alternative implications tend to emerge. 
In this section, I would like to consider four elements in a vision of human 
flourishing where the vision of genetic science and the vision of the Christian 
tradition differ: (1) identity; (2) children, strangers, and others; (3) control and 
power; and (4) social justice. 
1. The Nature of Identity 
Those who write on the ethical and religious dimensions of genetics fre. 
quently cite the statement by James D. Watson, co-discoverer of the double-
helix shape of DNA and former director of the Human Genome Project, that the 
project's goal is "to find out what human being is.''20 This question is dearly 
a dee~ly religious one. At one seminar I attended on genetics, for example, 11:e 
were mformed that each individual has up to twenty defective genes in thetr 
genome; translation: everyone is defective. It seemed to be the biological version 
of original sin, with genetic therapy as the Pelagian savior. A related cohort are 
the genetic determinists, those who affirm that one's genome is one's destiny; 
here we meet the biological equivalent of predestination. 
Many understand "what human being is" to be equivalent to the theological 
or philosophical concept of human nature. This raises two concerns: (1) that 
germline genetic interventions or human transgenic experiments might funda· 
mentally alter what makes us human, might alter our "cerebral cortex and central 
nervous system capable of self-consciousness, enquiry, rational ordering and 
analysis, moral judgment and choice" ;21 and (2) the implicit claim that, given the 
equation of the human genome with "what human being is" and human nature, 
the Human Genome Project will produce a genetic definition of the "normal' 
human being. 
2DJames D. Watson. Quoted in Science 243 Oanuary 13, 1989): 167. 
21G. R. Dunstan, "Gene Therapy, Human Nature, and the Churches," lnti.'Tnationa!Jouf'Wll 
of Bioethics 2.4 (October-December 1991): 236. 
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Both notions arc thickly laden with particular convictions about what should 
be valued. The content of the "human" varies with history and culture. Likewise 
with the "normal." While it may be possible to determine an average or common 
genetic distribution, in many conversations a not so subtle shift occurs between 
notions of "normal" and notions of "normative." What if geneticists determine 
that part of the normal human genetic complement is a gene for adultery? Is it 
therefore normative? On what basis do or will we decide which characteristics 
are "human," "normal" and "undesirable"? What is to decide this? How quickly 
does "ideal" elide into "normal"? How do social structures and ideologies of 
"normalcy" reinforce each other? 
Correlating religious doctrine and genetic science is a tricky affair. Here 
I will avoid discussing the epistemological issues and mention two practical 
problems. The most obvious problem is the one that has affected all attempts to 
discuss human nature: historically, socially, and culturally constructed concepts 
are read into nature or human biology, and human biology is then used as 
a warrant to provide an "objective" basis for a socially constructed belief or 
position. For example, Ronald Cole-Turner has attempted to correlate genetics 
and notions of free will and predestination: 
Correlations between genes and behavior, which will multiply as the genome project goes 
f~rward, are remarkably compatible with the more traditional view of original sin as. a 
dtsordering of the will. According to this traditional view, it is not merely that the wtll 
struggles against an unruly body. The will itself is disordered and does not do what it 
wants to do. Paul's self-described "wretched man" (Romans 7:24) is consonant with the 
insight emerging from genetics. Our whole being, including the center of our personhood 
together with its will, is influenced by our genes. . . . 
· .. Our genes carry the legacy of our evolution; and our personhood Itself, mcludmg our 
capacities for consciousness, moral decision, and faith, arises from our genes as selected 
by evolution. Specific decisions and beliefs, of course, are not carried genetically. But our 
genes apparently do carry our individual inclination toward broad categories of attitude, 
religiosity, and behavior .... In time, we will come to see how our individual genotype 
influences not merely our eye color but our social attitudes, behaviors, and religious 
activities .... Our souls are as different as our bodies.22 
Perhaps faith is a mutant version of reason. 
A second problem arises when science is equated with objective, value-
neutral, indisputable fact. Then, in trying to create a "fit" between a religious 
belief and a scientific position, the religious belief must give way. Again, Cole-
Turner illustrates this: 
Christianity has assumed that all are morally and spiritually equal. All have s!nn~d, 
all stand in need of grace, and all have the same degree of need and of_ capaCit~h~~ 
salvation. All have the same moral capability, and all are eq~ally respo~stble/or I' 
behavior. Thanks to research in genetics, we are learning that thts presump~lOn ~ ec:r~ Ity 
no longer holds .... We will learn how we vary in our capacity for ~ora an mreltgt~~st 
b h . h 1 t b in with a new ax10m-na e Y• e avwrs .... Needless to say, our t eo ogy mus eg · t of moral and 
we are all individual before God, with a unique set of genes and a umque se 
" T urnal of Religion and Health 
22Ronald Cole-Turner, "Religion and the Human Genome, 0 
31.2 (Summer 1992): 17D-172. 
341 
342 
Christian Scholu's Revirw 
. . . 1 · 1 be personalized as well as personal. lndi\'id· spirit~al needs and capabl~lttes. S~~:~~~:tnated against .... (Thus) a growing awareness 
ual dlfferenc~s .mdu.st. bde aalfl.ftlyrmshedou' ld prompt us to rethink the idea of redemption .... (O)ur 
of our genetic m IVI u cd · J th ( 1 th 
d I l'fe ht'stories affect the form of our r emption. n c u ure, e genes an not mere your I • • • d' 'd 1 · 1· 23 
d .' f 1 t'on and of the spiritual life will need to recogmze tn tvt ua vana ton. octnnes o sa va 1 
For Christians, normativity, identity and the meaning of the "human" de-
rive from sources other than genetics, sources which serve to interpret genetic 
information rather than viCe versa. Christians affirm through worship, practice, 
and story that identity is not determined by one's relationship to one's gen~me 
but rather by one's relationship to God and to God's cause. Through baptism, 
we are "born again," born into a new life and a new identity. Creation is not 
negated but is recreated; the identity derived from one's genetic component is 
now normed by,the identity given through baptism, by being cngraftcd into the 
body of Christ in eucharist, by following a call to discipleship. 
This approach to identity may help counter a number of disconcerting social 
trends. It will counter the myth of the genetic ideal by locating the description 
of an "ideal" life in relationship with God and community. It will counter the 
trend toward genetic uniformity by creating a framework that values and thereby 
prefers diversity ("We, though many, are one"). It will help remind us that "who 
we are" is only in small part constituted by our nature and genetic heritage: 
a good deal depends on "who is with us" through our growth and life, the 
conditions under which we grow, and "what we do" or "how we live" with 
our inheritance. 
2. Attitudes toward Children, Strangers and Others 
Current genetic testing largely involves screening the genetic makeup of 
embryos and fetuses with the assumption that the genetically "defective" will 
be either aborted (if they are in utero) or not implanted (if they are ill vitro). 
Claims are beginning to be made that "couples have no obligation to produce 
genetically defective offspring" or that couples-or individuals-have a "right" 
to produce children free from genetic defects. Germline genetic interventions-
both therapeutic and enhancing-are increasingly championed. 
If genetic technologies make it increasingly easy to assay an embryo's ge-
netic makeup, and individuals are persuaded to abort "undesirable" fetuses, it 
is conceivable that society will look less favorably on those who choose either 
not to have their children screened or who, in light of screening, choose to 
bring these children to life. It is also conceivable that our utilitarian, bottom-line, 
efficiency-dominated society will be less and less likely to provide the financial 
and communal support for these children and their families when they are 
clearly "products" of choice and not chance. Decisions to give birth to imperfect 
children may become. understood as "socially irresponsible." Abortions of the 
23"Religion and the Human Genome," pp. 171-172. 
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"defective" may even begin to be understood as "morally responsible," insofar 
as the autonomy of these defective fetuses may be compromised significantly, 
and they may be subjected to suffering.2-t 
In the course of perfci:ting germline techniques, mistakes will be made 
which can produce lasting harms. What do we do then? If mistakes are in-
troduced into an embryo's genetic makeup, two courses of action are open: 
simple destruction of "failures" or the killing/ abortion of abnormal fetuses whose 
phenotypes do not co~pond to initial expectations. Many scientists would 
understand the implanting of a "defective" blastocyst as a mistake and a waste 
of resources; they would prefer to have a "successful" outcome of the procedure. 
To proceed in the area of germline experimentation will entail the conscious 
acceptance that some embryos will be created solely as experimental material 
and others will necessarily be sacrificed for the sake of something else-science, 
others, etc. Not only is it questionable to use other, even potential, persons as 
means to an uncertain end, but it is questionable whether we should accept the 
assumption that genetically altered but defective embryos should be destroyed. 
What is the moral status of the "defective" unborn? 
In the face of these technologies, Christians will need to revisit their the-
ological understanding of children. This understanding will be informed by 
affirmations that life-and therefore children-are gifts.25 This understanding of 
children will likewise be informed by the practice of baptism, in which parents 
give their children over to death that they may be born anew as God's children 
called to serve God's kingdom. God's purposes for our children-and for us 
through our children-may well be different from our purposes for our children 
and ourselves. 
Congregations will need to examine as well the role children play in their 
common life,. and the ways in which the life and social commitments of the 
community enable its members to welcome the other, the stranger, and those who 
24We can find evidence of this position in, again, Ronald Cole-Turner: "[W]hen it is a 
question of the genetic health of the unborn, in most genetic diseases there are only two 
medical interventions, pregnancy prevention and pregnancy termination .... Couples at 
risk who do not wish to forgo having offspring, and all other couples who are not screened, 
and conceive a child with a genetic defect, are left with the only remaining option: abortion" 
("Religion and the Human Genome," p. 165). Clearly, bearing, welcoming and raising the 
child is not an option. He continues: "To do nothing (that is, to allow the pregnancy to 
continue) is to choose that a life of pain be allowed to continue to the point that the pain is 
experienced. It is to withdraw the only available act of mercy. But the only act we can qffer 
is to terminate the prospects of an individual human life, precious to God even if destined 
to painful brevity" (Ibid., 166). To be clear, Cole-Turner does not limit these statements 
only to genetic diseases that promise severe and unrelenting pain; they are general. 
25For fuller discussions of the meaning of children see Verhey, "Morality of Genetic Engi-
neering," and Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the 
Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1986); Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); 
and Vision and Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974). 
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are less than perfect. Does the congregation integrate or marginalize those who 
are not "normal" or "successful" or "perfect" and thereby make it more difficult 
for parents to welcome a child who is different? These practices and beliefs, 
in conjunction with Christian commitments to serving the needy, the marginal-
ized, the outcast, to welcoming the stranger in hospitality, provide resources for 
individuals faced with decisions to submit their fetuses to genetic testing. 
3. Control and Power 
Genetics is equipping us with powerful tools for determining our own 
future, as well as that of our children and our environment. Some are hopeful 
in the face of these new powers: 
God has put into our hands the possibility of what has so long been demanded by the 
great world religions, a change in man himself .... To succeed will be to begin a new and 
glorious stage in the history of what has been so defective a humanity.26 
Others foresee in the powers of genetics the destruction of humanity, either 
by some alteration in the fundamental genetic basis of human nature or by a 
reduction of genetic diversity. The vehicle for this putative salvation or perdition 
is genetic technology. But the effects of technology need not be so apocalyptic 
to require serious consideration. 
Technology, far from being a neutral tool amenable to human purposes, 
changes us as we use it. As Allen Verhey has noted, "although technologies are 
introduced as increasing our options, they can quickly become socially enforced. 
The automobile was introduced as an option to the horse, but try to ride a 
horse home on the interstate and you'll find yourself in trouble."27 In a culture 
increasingly unable to engage in moral discourse, technological fixes become 
the remedy of choice for social problems. Moreover, technology may further 
exacerbate the social conditions which give rise to the problems. For example, 
the abortion pill-RU 486-may make abortion quicker and less painless, but 
by removing the symptom-unwanted pregnancy-it may well deflect attention 
from the underlying problem, namely, that 1.5 million American women and 
girls each year find themselves pregnant when they do not want to be and feel 
compelled to abort. their children. 
Most technological advances are heralded as methods for controlling the 
contingencies of nature and for increasing the range ofhuman choices. Be it the 
problems of geography, pregnancy, or disease, technology is a vehicle for making 
nature amenable to human purposes. These questions of control are questions of 
power-power over those deemed "defective," power over our children, power 
over ourselves, power over nature. Power is also pursued under the auspices of 
26Robert Davis, "What New Adam Lurks Inside the Gene Splice?" New York Times, March 
15, 1987. 
27"Morality of Genetic Engineering," p. 134. 
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be charged with power over others . 
. 1~ contr~st to both _of these positions, in Scripture, creed and worship, 
Chnshans datly affirm dtfferent understandings of control and power. Davis' 
long-awaited transformation of humanity is affirmed to be ultimately an es-
chatological event; certainly, humanity can change humanity but not necessarily 
for the better. Christianity affirms that the remedy of the spiritual and moral 
defect that plagues humanity will be a matter of God's doing in God's time. 
Scripturally and theologically, there is an infinite qualitative difference between 
the transformation of humanity wrought by humanity and the transformation of 
humanity promised and wrought by God .. 
Christians are called to avoid worshiping the "false idol of technology:•zs 
But they are also called to be disciples, to pursue God's purposes in the world 
responsibly, such as healing the sick and attending to the sufferer. In these 
pursuits, Christians employ technology. To employ technology with integrity will 
require that clergy and congregations together reflect on the relationship between 
God's agency and human agency as well as the meanings and temptations 
of technology. Christian reflection on technology as such will entail Christian 
reflection on the relationship between humanity and nature. Are we stewards, 
co-creators, or "created co-creators"? At each step, when confronted with each 
new technology, Christians will need to ask themselves whether the kinds of 
power offered are compatible with the kind of power practiced by God and 
witnessed to in the Christian story of a God who redeemed humanity through 
suffering on a cross and whose power is made perfect in weakness. 
This mention of "created co-creators" raises another issue. Discussion of 
genetic technologies and their attendant ethical analyses is often short-circuited 
by recourse to "bad axioms" or slogans, one of the most common of which is 
"playing God." Although often invoked, the meaning of this phrase has received 
scant treatment. C. Keith Boone reminds us that as with most bad axioms, 
although employed in the place of a sufficient argument, the slogan "playing 
God" points toward a kernel of truth that warrants closer inspection.29 
In bioethics in general, agents are accused of "playing God" in situations 
involving decisions about who lives and who dies. Likewise in genetics,_ the 
slogan arises in two contexts, although primarily in the second-whether to abort 
genetically "defective" fetuses (i.e., who dies?) and regarding the manipulation 
of the germline, whether nonhuman or human (i.e., who-or sometimes, what-
lives?). The ability to create potentially new life forms or new human individu-
ality seems analogous to the power premised of God in the attribute "Creator." 
28David A. Grimes, "Technological Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical Innova-
tion," Journal of the American Medical Association 269.23 (June 16, 1993): 3030-3033. 
29C. Keith Boone, "Bad Axioms in Genetic Engineering," The Hastings Center Report (Au-
gust/September 1988): 9-13. 
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There are a number of problems with the notion of "playing G_od." On 
the one hand, as Christians, we are called to "play God," to model ourselves 
as closely to God as possible. While the notion of "play" may, of course, carry 
more flippant connotations than the phrases "be obedient to" or "follow" or "to 
be disciples," we invariably look to God's character to find the essence of the 
human, the "imago dei." In discussions of genetics, the most frequently invoked 
divine characteristic is God's creativity, in which many find a call to and a model 
for our own creativity, identifying creativity as the "imago dei" and the essence 
of human being as "created co-creators." · 
The reason that the slogan "playing God" is unhelpful, then, is not that this 
activity of creativity is forbidden. Rather, the problem is that the God Christians 
are called to follow is a very different God. The slogan "playing God" reduces the 
identity of God to a single characteristic-e.g., the power to create-from a single 
biblical story found in the book of Genesis. The God imaged in "playing God" is 
the God of the Enlightenment, the same God who renders the modem "theod-
icy" question so problematic. 3D This God--omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, 
eternal, unchanging-is not the God known in and through Jesus Christ. The 
Enlightenment God emerges when "religion" is conceived generically, abstracted 
from its stories, histories, and particularities, presented as tolerant, universal, and 
nonoffensive for the purpose of "dialogue." 
Christians, however, know that ultimately they cannot really play God. 
God's power to create ex nihilo and to make a new heaven and new earth in 
the future is conceptually as well as practically unavailable to humanity. We 
constantly exercise our ability to create and recreate-new persons, new species, 
new conformations of nature. Yet no matter how proficient we become at ma-
nipulating created matter, the form of our creative endeavor will be qualitatively 
different from that we affirm of God. 
Thus, while the slogan "playing God" fails to refute a particular endeavor, 
neither does the recognition of our call to be creative--our status as "created co-
creators" -render a blanket sanction. The vision of God's creativity epitomized in 
the Genesis stories must be held in tension with other biblical images: suffering 
servant, resurrected savior, Body of Christ. The kernel of truth hidden in the 
slogan is thus quite different from the way the slogan is employed: 
In the Jewish and Christian traditions "playing God" is associated with pride and arro· 
gance, the aping of divine power, or the attempt to gain salvation without the help of 
divinity. It is not the use of power and creativity that offends but rather attributing power 
to one's own resources .... " [P]Iaying God" is not, in this usage, an act against morality, but 
rather one against faith .... Yet these traditions might well morally object to ... problems 
with human conceits about our ability to predict or control the outcomes of our actions.31 
30See Stanley Hauerwas's discussion of this notion of God in Naming the Silences: God, 
Medicine, and the Problems of Suffering (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). 
31Boone, "Bad Axioms," p. 10. 
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4. Social Justice 
Ba~ic primary health services are unavailable to large portions of the u.s. 
population (over 10%); the statistics for world health are even more dismal.32 Yet 
th~ ~ederal government has committed to spend $3 billion over 15 years-$200 
m1lh~n per year~n the Human Genome Project. Private concerns, including 
the biotechnology mdustry, have committed even more funds. Genetic biotech 
companies are making huge sums of money; their activity in the stock market 
has made millions more for other investors. Yet scientists are not unanimous in 
the scientific or medical merit of the Human Genome Project or its ability to 
meet its goals within its timeline or budget. 
Is it just to allocate this magnitude of resources to genetics when it is well 
known that the primary cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide is poverty, 
when millions of people around the world have no access to the basics of modern 
medicine-sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines? It is estimated that only 5% of the 
genome contains genes correlated with disease conditions; is the investment in 
the Human Genome Project proportional to its health benefits? Allied to these 
questions are other questions of allocation, questions of the allocation of costs 
and benefits. Who pays the costs and reaps the benefits? Not necessarily the 
same persons. It has been argued that one sector of our population-that of the 
unborn-currently incurs a disproportionate burden of harm, insofar as some 
embryos are created solely for research purposes while others deemed inferior or 
"defective" are discarded. Moreover, given the emphasis on screening or altering 
nascent life, there will be an undue impact of these technologies on women (just 
as women already bear the bulk of the social cost of caring for those with genetic 
conditions). 
The current structure of health care is grossly unjust. Because of limited 
access to health care among many populations-especially urban and poor-
health problems become concentrated in these communities. For example, they 
experience higher infant mortality and decreased life expectancy. As gene therapy 
becomes more widely practiced, we can only expect that these injustices will 
be exacerbated. Somatic gene therapy will likely be expensive and available 
primarily to those whose health insurance will cover it, and the same is true for 
genetically-engineered pharmaceuticals. Enhancement programs would further 
compound the gross inequalities and discriminatory practices that constitute our 
32To quote from the Christian Medical Commission of the World Council of Churches: "In 
Asia, Africa, the Pacific and Latin America .... Seventy percent of the people live below the 
poverty line with little access to services like health, education, housing, land, food, and 
stable jobs .... In Brazil, for example, 6 million of the 10 million mentally ill are children, 
and 500,000 children die of malnutrition every year. Eighty-five percent of the 450 million 
people in the world who suffer from disability come from developing countries, which 
have only 2% of the resources to treat and care for disabilities" (Healing and Wholeness: The 
Churches' Role in Health (Geneva: Christian Medical Commission, 1990], pp. 24-25). 
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culture, insofar as those with power and means will choose what characteristics 
will be valued, and those characteristics will undergird their own social power. 
This may well concentrate genetic problems and genetically-related diseases, con-
ditions, and attributes in economically-disadvantaged sectors of the population, 
exacerbating social class distinctions and likely racial distinctions as well. 
In the face of these statistics, it is difficult to justify a blanket recommenda-
tion to "religious groups to advocate access to reliable genetic information and 
counseling services .... " When members of religious communities take what 
they know of God, identity, children, strangers, control and power, learned from 
their activities of worship and common life, into the world of their everyday 
activities, they will likely not tum into genetic lobbyists. Rather, activities of 
Christian social ministry in the age and culture of genetics will more likely 
resemble activities of Christian social ministry prior to the advent of genetics: 
welcoming and caring for the marginalized, the sick, the less than perfect; work-
ing for justice for those who are oppressed and voiceless; identifying attitudes 
and practices which exacerbate unjust social structures; living in ways consistent 
with their convictions, and supporting others in this difficult task. 
IV. Conclusion 
For those of us raised in a scientific culture, and even more for those of us 
trained as scientists, it is difficult not to be dazzled by the abilities and potential 
of genetics. Gene therapy seems to hold promise equal to that of penicillin. To 
understand the quiet, constant and microscopic activities of chromosomes, DNA, 
genes and their cross-generation effects, is to be awed, for some humbled, and 
for those who find pleasure in understanding, to be gratified. 
But those who likewise know from recent history and personal experience 
the proclivities of human beings and Western culture, and who find themselves 
shaped by the stories, the convictions, the self-understandings of the Christian 
community, rightly pause-to learn more, to consider together, to discuss, to 
pray, to evaluate. The advent of genetic medicine does indeed call theologians, 
clergy, and lay persons as well to re-examine their interpretations of creation, 
. human nature, moral choices, the character of God, and some interpretations may 
emerge as inadequate or ill-formed; some, however, will emerge with new power 
and relevance. Genetic medicine challenges us to renew the practice of moral 
discourse and to renew the congregation as the place where jt occurs. Without 
such a practice or a place, congregants will be ill-equipped to live differently 
in the face of the powerful, often utilitarian, interpretations and implications 
presented to them by genetic medicine. 
